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TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY
OF DEATH: UNDERSTANDING WHY THE
UNITED STATE'S USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
VIOLATES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Michelle McKee*
I.

INTRODUCTION

From this day forward I will no longer tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to
the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for
regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and legally obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.'
The above emanated from Justice Blackmun's strongly worded dissent in Callins v. Collins in 1994. Despite Justice Blackmun's intellectually
and morally astute opinion, the remainder of the Court has allowed the "machinery of death" to trample onward in the same discriminatory and often
2
arbitrary manner of which the Court disapproved in Furman v. Georgia.
In fact, the United States has the largest death row population in the
world, with over 3,300 people awaiting a premature death at the hands of
the state.3 Among these inmates are those, like Perry Cobb, who will spend
years on death row for crimes that they did not commit. 4 Also included are
mentally challenged and juvenile offenders, many of whom were sentenced
to death without the jury hearing any evidence of mitigating factors. Other
prisoners among this lot will be executed despite evidence of their inno* Candidate, J.D. June 2000, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.S. 1997
Cornell University. The author would like to thank Professor Makau Mutua, for his
encouragement and input on this note, and her fiancee James Cubbon, for his ongoing assistance and support in this and other professional endeavors.
I Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (J. Blackmun
dissenting).
2
408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) (holding that the death penalty is
unconstitutional).
3

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RIGHTS FOR

ALL (1998).

Debbie Howlett, Time Lost to Death Row Scars Ex-inmates, USA TODAY, Nov.
16, 1998. Mr Cobb is only one of seventy-five death row inmates who were freed
after being wrongfully convicted. See id.

4
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cence or without any review of their case by an appellate court. However,
the State justifies its killing as somehow more righteous than the atrocity
that it seeks to punish. The majority of the world and all of the United
States' neighbors disagree. The international community believes that the
death penalty is morally and legally wrong and cannot coexist with the protection of human rights.
This article will prove that the abolition of the death penalty has
evolved into customary international law and that the United States has
failed to conform to this international abolitionist norm. Not only is the
abolition of the death penalty the general practice among nations, but these
nations have abolished the death penalty out of a sense of legal obligation
and have pressured non-conformist nations to do the same. In spite of this
international pressure, the United States has continued to exercise the death
penalty in a manner that violates customary international law and international agreements. It is time that the United States had the courage to comply with customary international law and accept its legal and moral
responsibility to protect human rights and abolish the death penalty.
II.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Customary international law is recognized as a binding source of
international law on all nations.5 Section 102(2) of the Restatement (third),
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, defines customary international
law as resulting from "a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."'6 This definition focuses on two
aspects, 1) the action or practice of states and 2) that action is taken out of a
sense of legal obligation. "A practice can be general even if it is not universally followed; there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a
practice must be, but it should reflect wide acceptance among the states
particularly involved in the relevant activity."'7 Furthermore, "the practice
necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively short
duration."8
See Statute of International Court of Justice Art. 38 (listing customary international law as a source of international law; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrED STATES § 102 (1987) (defining international law as a
rule "that has been accepted as such by the international community of states" and
one such form as customary international law).
5

6

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD), FOREIGN

§ 102 (2) (1987).
7 Id. § 102 Cmt b.
8

Id.

RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES
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The second aspect of customary international law, a sense of legal
obligation to act in a particular manner, is referred to as opino juris sive
necessitaatis(hereinafter opinojuris). "It must appear that states follow the
practice out of a sense of legal obligation . . . a practice that is generally

followed but which states feel free to disregard does not contribute to customary law." 9 Explicit evidence of opino juris is not necessary, but actions
or omissions of states and their actions through international organizations
may be used to infer opino juris10
In proving that a rule has become international law, the appropriate
evidence is dependent upon "the particular source from which the rule is
alleged to derive."11 In the case of customary international law, "the 'best
evidence' is proof of state practice, ordinarily by reference to official documents and other indications of government action."' 12 Generally, great evidentiary weight is accorded to the judgements and opinions of international
tribunals, judgements and opinions of national tribunals, the writings of
scholars, and pronouncements of states that undertake to state a rule of international law, when such pronouncements are not seriously challenged by
other states. 13

The United States has recognized the binding nature of customary
international law through the Constitution and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. Article VI of the Constitution of the United States declares the
Constitution, laws of the United States, and treaties made under the authority of the United States to be "the supreme law of the land."' 14 Customary
international law and other international agreements are also federal law
and thus supreme over state law. 15 The Constitution also grants Congress
'16
the power to "define and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations.
From its inception, the Supreme Court has recognized the binding
nature of international law on the United States. In Chisolm v. Georgia,
Chief Justice John Jay observed that the United States "had by taking a
place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of na-

9

Id. cmt c.

10

See id. cmt c & Rptr's n. 2.

11 Id. § 103.
12 Id. § 103 cmt a.
13 See id § 103.
14

U.S. CONST.

VI.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 102 cmt. d; US CONST. art. VI.
U.S. CONST. Art. I. § 8, cl. 10.

15 See
16

Art.
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tions."' 17 Beginning in 1804, the Supreme Court developed two principles
of international law.' 8 The first was that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains." 19 This principle was developed further through a trilogy of cases
in which the Court established that treaties were on equal footing with federal statutes and that where a treaty and statute cannot be reconciled, the
20
later in time controls.
The second principle established early in the Court's history was
that customary international law is binding on the United States and thus
the courts of the United States have the power to enforce it. In The Paquete
Habana, the Supreme Court sat as an international tribunal and applied customary international law to invalidate the seizure of fishing vessels during
wartime.

21

Since establishing these early principles, the Court has looked to
international norms and comparative jurisprudence as sources for "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" in its
eighth Amendment analysis of whether a particular practice is "cruel and
unusual. '22 While the Court is not in agreement about the role of international norms in its eighth amendment analysis, the Court relied on such
norms in its ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma that the execution of juveniles
23
under the age of sixteen violated the eighth amendment.
Justice Blackmun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWSLETTER (AMERICAN Society of International Law, Washington D.C.), March 1994, at 1. (quoting Chislom v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793)).
18 See id.
17

19 Id., (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)).
20 See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600, 602-603 (1889);
see also AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

NEWSLE'TTER,

supra note 17,

at 2.
21
22

The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290 (1900).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion). See

also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary International Norms to the
Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 165 (1995). Fitzpatrick discusses the utility of international norms in challenging the execution of
juveniles.
23

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-831 (1988) (relying on interna-

tional data in its decision that execution of persons under the age of sixteen violates
the eighth amendment); but see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n. l (1989)
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (refusing to consider international norms as relevant
to the determination of a standard of decency); but compare id. at 389-390 (dissent-

ing opinions) ( Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens relied on comparative
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It is clear that both the United States Constitution and Supreme
Court precedent recognize the supremacy of international law, including
customary international law, and its enforceability in the courts of the
United States. Therefore, by proving that the abolition of the death penalty
is customary international law, it is shown that courts are bound to enforce
such law.
III. THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AS CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

In recent years, there has been a stark increase in the abolition of
the death penalty, such that a majority of the world has now abolished the
practice.2 4 As discussed above, to prove that the abolition of the death penalty is customary international law it must be shown to be both a general
and consistent practice among states and a practice done with the requisite
opino juris.

Although one could infer opino juris from the widespread act of
abolishment alone, 25 there is ample additional evidence to show that nations
have acted with the requisite opinojuris. Such evidence includes the number of international agreements aimed at abolishing the death penalty; the
actions of international organizations; the expressed disapproval toward
retentionist nations; nations' judicial decisions concerning extradition of
persons to be tried for capital offenses; and national judicial decisions.
A. The Abolition of the Death Penalty as a General PracticeAmong
Nations

The status of the death penalty in the world was discussed in the
Report of the Secretary-General to the Commission on Human Rights of
January 16, 1998.26 Not only does the content of the report show that the
majority of the world has abolished the death penalty, but the fact that such
a report was required by resolution 1997/12 (paragraph 6) is evidence of the
international norm of abolishment of the death penalty. Resolution 1997/12
requires the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission "a yearly suppractice and international instruments, as they had as the plurality in Thompson).
See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
24 Report of Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission Resolution
1997/12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/82 (1998). De facto abolition means that a country has not executed anyone in the last 10 years. De jure means that the country is
abolitionist by law, i.e. the death penalty is not issued for any crime.
25
26

See RESTATEMENT (third) supra note 6.

Supra note 24.
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plement on changes in law and practice concerning the death penalty worldwide to his quinquennial report on capital punishment and implementation
of the Safeguards guaranteeing the protection of the rights of those facing
the death penalty" and to "consult with Governments, specialized agencies
'27
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
Thus, Resolution 1997/12 illustrates the commitment of the Commission toward the abolition of the death penalty. A report every five years
was not sufficient to monitor the progress toward international abolition;
the status must be monitored annually. Requiring states to submit reports
annually and subsequently receive an analysis of their collective behavior is
likely to increase the pressure that States feel to abolish the death penalty.
In the particular report that was filed on January 16, 1998, the international norm of abolishment was evident. Accordingly, the SecretaryGeneral was satisfied with the results of the information that he received
regarding the status of the death penalty during the reporting period of January 1996 through December 1997.28
The last (fifth) quinquennial report affirmed the trend toward an increased pace of abolition, noted in the fourth
quinquennial report, and concluded that 'an unprecedented
number of countries have abolished or suspended use of the
death penalty' and that from 1989 through 1995 'the pace
of change can be seen to have been quite remarkable....
information in the present report supports the conclusion
29
that the trend toward abolition continues.
Gains in the move toward international abolition during the reporting period included three additional states that abolished the death penalty,
moratoriums in three nations that retained the death penalty, and seven
states ratifying one of the international instruments pledged at abolition of
the death penalty. 30 These gains were significant since only two years had
Id. at 1 1.
The Secretary-General decided to include information for the prior two years,
even though he was only required to submit an "annual report."
29 Report on Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. Doc. E/1995/78, [ 94,
96.
30 See supra note 24,
11-14. Belgium, Poland, and Georgia abolished the death
penalty. Russian Federation proposed a bill placing a moratorium on executions to
its State Duma. Malawi's President commuted all death sentences and pledged not
to sign any execution orders while in office. Albania declared that it would place a
moratorium on executions until the death penalty was abolished. Id.
27
28
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passed since the last report. However, some non-conformist behavior was
also observed during the reporting period. 31 Two countries expanded the
scope of the death penalty by adding an additional offense to their capital
crimes and four abolitionist de facto countries resumed executions during
32
the reporting period.
Since the issuance of the Secretary-General's report, nine more
countries abolished the death penalty, bringing the total number of abolitionist nations to 108. 33 Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine,
Turkmenistan, and East Timor changed from retentionist to abolitionist nations. 34 Canada and Great Britain were formally countries that had abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes and moved toward absolute
abolition in 1998. 35 This means that only 83 of the countries included in the
36
original report remain retentionist.
As the Secretary-General aptly concluded, the trend toward abolition of the death penalty had continued to increase. The increase in the
number of abolitionist countries has increased because nations have felt legally obligated to conform to the international norm of abolition. Those
nations that have not yet abolished the death penalty feel the pressure to
conform as the opino juris for abolition swells from the international to
national conscience.
It is also important to realize that among North America, South
America, Central America, and Western Europe; the United States, Guyana,
Guatemala, and Belize are the only non-conformist nations. 37 These nations
should especially feel legally obligated to abolish the death penalty since
the existence of "regional" customary international law is recognized by the
Restatement as having the same binding effect on member-states of that
region. 38 Moreover, the American Commission on Human Rights and the
It is fair to characterize the behavior as non-conformist to the customary norm
of abolition.
32 See supra note 24,
16, 17. "Abolitionist de facto" is defined as countries
retaining the death penalty but have not carried out executions in the last ten years.
Id.
31

See Amnesty International, United States of America: Failing the FutureDeath Penalty Developments, March 1998-2000, AMR 51/03/00 (March 2000).
34 See id. at n. 3; supra note 24, table 1.
35 See supra note 24, table 3.
36 See id table 1.
37 Id. at tables 1-4 (listing individual countries as retentionist, totally abolitionist,
33

abolitionist for ordinary crimes, and abolitionist de facto). These four nations are
the only retentionists nations listed from the above mentioned regions.
38 note 6 § 102 cmt. e.

160

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6

European Commission on Human Rights have both created protocols to
abolish the death penalty and pressure member nations to work toward abolition of the death penalty.
For example, the American Convention on Human Rights provides
that the death penalty can only be imposed for the most serious crimes in
countries that have not abolished the death penalty and that its application
39
may not be extended to crimes for which it does not presently apply. It
also states that the death penalty may not be reestablished in states that have
abolished it.40 The Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
goes further by prohibiting the application of the death penalty and prohibit41
ing any reservations to the Protocol.
The norm toward abolition is currently spreading to Africa and
Asia. Amnesty International believes that there has been "significant progress toward ending the use of the death penalty in Africa" since its last
special report on Africa and the death penalty in 1991.42 As of December
1996, the number of de facto or de jure abolitionist nations in Africa increased to twenty-three, while the number of nations who had retained the
death penalty and used it in the past ten years was thirty.43 Amnesty characterized the inability of many African nations to respond to the opino juris
toward abolition as hindered by declining economies and political
instability. 44
Declining economies have led to increased crime rates and growing
poverty, which, in turn, have caused governments to resort to use of the
death penalty to show the population that they are determined to fight
crime. 45 Political instability has led governments to use the death penalty to
maintain their political power by executing leading advocates of political
reform or perpetrators of political violence. 46 The retentionist governments
in power have likely felt the pressure to conform with the majority of abolitionist nations, but have failed to conform out of a fear that constrains their
See AMERICAN CONVENTION
tered into force July 18, 1978).
40 See id. 3.
39

41

ON HUMAN RIGHTS art.

4, [ 2; 9 I.L.M. 156 (en-

PROTOCOL TO THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO ABOLISH

THE DEATH PENALTY November 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1447 (1990).
42 Africa: A New Future Without the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT, Jan.
43

Id. at 1.

44 Id.
45 Id.
46
Id.

30, 1997.
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actions. This fear either stems from a perceived threat to the social order or
to that government regime's own political power.
However, it is important to note that, in spite of the political and
economic hardships faced by these nations, that almost half of these nations
have been able to achieve the abolition of the death penalty. Even nations
that retain the death penalty have, through internal efforts, moved closer
toward abolishing its use. For example, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe
set aside the death sentences of four men convicted of murder and replaced
them with sentences of life imprisonment, on the grounds that the conditions and circumstances on death row over a prolonged period of time constituted inhuman and degrading punishment.47 Furthermore, Zimbabwe has
limited the scope of its use of the death penalty, reducing capital offenses to
48
murder, treason, and certain military crimes.
Other nations that retain the death penalty have taken similar actions to move closer to abolishment. These measures have included judicial
decisions that have found particular methods of execution unconstitutional
and the elimination of secret or special capital tribunals, which often denied
defendants the right to a fair trial. 49 All of these efforts indicate that African
nations realize that there is an international norm of abolishment and feel
legally obligated to attempt to comply.
The compliance with customary law has also been difficult where
countries are ruled by Islamic governments. Arab and Islamic nations have
defended the death penalty in the name of obedience to Islamic law and the
strictures of the shari'a. 50 Nevertheless, the Arab Charter of Human Rights
recognizes the right to life. 51 While it does allow the death penalty for
"serious violations of general law," it does prohibit capital punishment for
crimes committed under the age of eighteen, pregnant women, and nursing
mothers for two years after childbirth. 52 This provision, along with the
work of scholars such as Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, provide hope that the
Islamic tenants of the Shari'a may be reconciled with human rights values,
53
such as the abolition of the death penalty.
See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Judgement No. S.C. 73/93 (1993), 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 323 (1993).
48 See supra note 42, at 4.
47

49

Id.

50

See Schabas, InternationalLaw and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55
& LEE L. REv. 797, 806-7 (1998).
Id. at 806.

WASH.
51

52 See id.
53 See generally Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World,
3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP ATLE-
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Progress toward abolition of the death penalty has also occurred
throughout the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation and the
Ukraine have responded to pressure by members of the Council of Europe
to abolish the death penalty. Both nations have signed Protocol No. 6 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty and, as stated previously, the Ukraine has abolished the death penalty.5 4 Additionally, the
Russian Federation has placed a moratorium on capital punishment, as required by the Council. 55 The addition of these states to the nations abolishing the death penalty is extremely significant and demonstrative of nations
acting with opino juris. Prior to signing Protocol No. 6, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine were among the World's leaders in number of executions carried out. 56 In response to intimations by other members of the
Council of Europe that their status on the council would be jeopardized if
they failed to comply, these nations felt compelled to abolish the death
penalty.
B. Evidence that Abolition has Occurred with Opino Juris Sive
Necessitaatis
Although the widespread abolition of the death penalty demonstrates action with opino juris, several other actions by States illustrate that
they are acting out of this sense of legal obligation.
1. Human Rights Instruments Aimed at Abolishing the Death Penalty
One such source of opino juris is found in the various human rights
instruments aimed at abolishing the death penalty. Joan Fitzpatrick explains that "treaty norms", via international agreements, serve as evidence
of a "parallel customary norm binding non-parties" and also as a source of
57
explanation for the state parties' compliance with the norm.
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
states that the parties to the Protocol believe that "abolition of the death
penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and progressive
SON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT LAW, POLITICS, MORALS

(1996).
54

See Schabas, supra note 50, at 829.

55

See id.

56

See id.

57

Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.

210
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development of human rights. '58 Also, the Protocol refers to article 6 of the
ICCPR as suggesting that abolition of the death penalty is desirable and
states that "all measures of abolition of the death penalty should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life. '59 Each party that
signed the Protocol agreed to abolish the death penalty in its jurisdiction,
without any reservations other than to use the death penalty "for a most
serious crime of a military nature during wartime." 60
The Council of Europe has abolished the use of the death penalty in
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It provides that "the death penalty
shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed. '61 Shortly after Protocol No. 6 came into force, the European Union,
through its Parliament, adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, which proclaims the abolition of the death penalty. 62
As previously discussed, the Inter-American system has created the
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty.63 Like the Protocol to the ICCPR, it abolishes the death
penalty except that states may choose to retain it for wartime "in accordance with international law" and does not allow any state to make reservations to its provisions.
2.

The Actions of the United Nations

In addition to these international agreements, nations have acted
through various intergovernmental organizations to promote abolition of the
death penalty. For example, the U.N., after several previous attempts,
passed two resolutions calling for the abolishment of the death penalty in
1996. The first is entitled Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the
Rights of those who face the Death Penalty, which calls on member states
that have not abolished the death penalty to effectively apply specifically
enumerated procedural safeguards. 64 A second resolution, passed in 1997,
calls for a moratorium on the death penalty and expresses concern that
states who use the death penalty are in violation of the ICCPR, Convention
58

SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, preamble.

59

Id.

Id. at art. 2.
61 Id.
62 See Schabas, supra note 50, at 831.
63 See supra note 41.
6 See Schabas, supra note 50, at 822.
60

ON CIVIL
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on the Rights of the Child, and the Procedural Safeguards in their use of the
death penalty. 65 It also calls on states to ratify the Second Optional
Protocol. 66
Resolutions such as these make it clear to retentionist states that
they are failing to comply with customary norms by failing to abolish the
death penalty. Furthermore, to require retentionist states to implement the
death penalty in a non arbitrary manner that is consistent with the provisions of other human rights instruments is to demonstrate to states that the
use of the death penalty is inconsistent with human rights instruments. A
state that legitimately attempts to comply with human rights instruments
will discover that such attempt is futile, as will be illustrated infra in the
discussion of the death penalty in the United States.
3. Targeted Disapproval Toward Retentionist States
Some action by states has been targeted toward specific non-conformist States. The United Nations' Human Rights Committee has officially
articulated its concerns with the Untied States' use of the death penalty, in
its comments to the United States' report on its implementation of the
ICCPR. 67 With regard to the death penalty, the Committee expressed concern with "the number of offenses punishable by the death penalty in a
number of states, the number of death sentences handed down by courts,
and the long stay on death row which... may amount to a breach of article
68
7 of the Covenant.
The Committee also sated that it "deplores the recent expansion of
the death penalty under federal law and the reestablishment of the death
penalty in a certain states. '69 It also deplored the provisions of state legislation that permitted the death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen
and the actual instances where such executions have been carried out.70 The
Committee also disapproved of the apparent lack of protection from the
death penalty of mentally retarded persons. 7' In response to these concerns,
the Committee urged the United States to revise federal and state legislation
65
66

Id. at 823.
Id.

Comments on the United States of America, Human Rights Committee, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79Add50 (1995).
67

68
69

Id.
Id.

14.

See id.
7' See id.

70
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to restrict the number of capital offenses to only the most serious crimes,
72
with an aim toward eventually abolishing the death penalty.
Another example of action targeted at the United States occurred on
May 6, 1994. The Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights sent a letter to the Governor of Illinois, requesting that
Illinois commute the execution of John Wayne Gacy. The Executive Secretary stated that "such action would be in the spirit of major human rights
instruments and the universal trend toward abolition of the death penalty. 7 3
Despite the Executive Secretary's efforts, Mr. Gacy was executed on May
74

10, 1994.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson, has also made a statement condemning the United States' use of
the death penalty. Ms. Robinson made a statement on February 4, 1998 in
response to the execution of Karla Faye Tucker. Ms. Tucker was the first
75
woman executed in Texas and the first in the United States since 1984.
Ms. Robinson stated that "the increasing use of the death penalty in the
United States and in a number of other states is a matter of serious concern
and runs counter to the international community's expressed desire for abo76
lition of the death penalty.
Nations besides the Untied States have also been targets of criticism
by international organizations. In 1995,"the U.N., its individual members,
the European Union and the Commonwealth condemned the Nigerian government for the execution of nine members of the Ongi ethnic group after a
seriously flawed trial. '77 In partial response to these attacks, Nigeria reinstated a number of trial rights, although Amnesty International contends
78
that these new rights still do not fully guarantee a fair trial.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, has been instrumental in targeting nonconformist nations. He has exposed the death penalty practices of the
United States, Nigeria, Algeria, Central African Republic, Egypt, Nigeria,
79
and Sierra Leone as inconsistent with international human rights norms.

Mr. Ndiave's reports force one to realize that the practice of the death pen72

73

See id. 31.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Request to Commute Execution,

33 I.L.M. 838 (American Society of International law, Washington, D.C. 1994).
74 See id.
75 Statement

by Mary Robinson, U.N. Doc. HR/98/6 (Feb. 4 1998).

76

Id.

77

Amnesty International, supra note 42, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 20.

78

79
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alty cannot be consistent with human rights law and is always "an exception
to the right of life." 80 "There is no right to capital punishment, and while
governments have the right to enact penal laws, these laws must conform to
8
basic principles of international human rights law." '
4. The Refusal to Extradite to Retentionist Nations
An illustrative example of states' acting toward abolition with the
requisite opinojuris has been provided by international cases brought about
by the refusal of one nation to extradite a person who is to be tried for a
capital offense in the nation requesting extradition. These cases arose, despite the existence of an extradition treaty between the two nations. One
such case is Soering v. United Kingdom, in which the European Court of
Human Rights held that the United Kingdom's extradition of Soering to
Virginia would constitute a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights because the conditions relating to the death penalty con82
stitute inhuman and degrading treatment.
A second case, which also involved extradition to the United States,
was decided by Italy's Constitutional Court, in Venezia v. Ministerio di
Grazia e Guistizia.83 In this case, the Court held that Italy did not have to
extradite Venezia because "participation of Italy in punishments that cannot
be imposed in peacetime was a breach of the Constitution." 84 The decision
was not influenced by the American prosecutor's assurance that the death
penalty would not be imposed if Venezia was extradited. Thus, while the
Court could have made a decision constrained to the particular facts in that
case, it made a ruling that would serve as precedent for Italy's refusal to
extradite to any country that imposes the death penalty.
A Canadian court has also allowed a refusal to extradite to the
United States on the basis of its use of the death penalty in United States of
America v. Burns and Rafy. 85 The British Columbia Court of Appeal was
faced with precedent that held that extradition could not be refused on the
basis of a violation of the right to life provision found in section seven of
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary, or arbitraryexecutions, Mission to the United States of America, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68/
Add.3 (1998).
81 Id. at 4.
82 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1989); See also
Schabas, supra note 50, at 838-39.
83 See Schabas, supra note 50, at 841 (discussing Venezia).
84
Id.
85 See Schabas, supra note 50, at 842-43, citing United States of America v. Bums
and Rafy, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524 (B.C.C.A.).
80
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition of section twelve of the Charter.8 6 Therefore, the
court based its decision on the right of Canadian citizens "to enter, live, and
remain in Canada" in section six of the Charter.8 7 The court reasoned that
the death penalty would infringe upon Bums' and Rafy's rights to citizenship because they would never be able to return to Canada if they were
executed, and thus upheld the refusal to extradite. 88
All of the above extradition cases illustrate the customary law status
that the abolition of the death penalty has achieved. States are so unsettled
by non-conformists, such as the United States, that they look for legal ways
to rationalize refusing extradition to a country with which it has created a
binding extradition treaty. Such behavior is per se evidence that states'
action of abolition is with opinojuris. States view the abolition of the death
penalty as a tenant of law that is more important than its treaty obligations.
Furthermore, nations hope to force compliance with the abolitionist norm
by sanctioning non-conformist behavior.
5.

National Decisions that Examine International Law

Recent national judicial decisions have also been instrumental in
showing that the abolitionist trend is motivated by opino juris. Even in
Zimbabwe, where the death penalty remains legal and in use, the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe relied on the judicial decisions of other nations to support its interpretation that the conditions on death row violated the nation's
Constitutional prohibition on inhuman or degrading punishment. 89 "Any
punishment or treatment incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ...

is repulsive. What

might not have been regarded as inhuman decades ago may be revolting to
the new sensitivities which emerge as civilization advances." 90
Chief Justice Gubbay's remarks demonstrate how a state practice
can be found violative of international standards and customary norms that
have only recently evolved, but "mark the progress of a maturing society." 9'
It is interesting that the United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to
86
87

See Kindler v. Canada [1997] 2 S.C.R. 779.
See Schabas, supra note 50, at 843.

A decision by the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the British Court of
Appeal's ruling in the case is currently pending.
89 See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-Gen88

eral, Judgement No. S.C. 73/93, 14 Hum Rts. L.J. 323 (1993).
90 Id. at 323 (Gubbay, C.J).
91

Id.
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use its eighth amendment "evolving standards of decency" analysis in as
discerning a manner as the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. Of course, to do
so would require all of the Justices on the U.S. Court to acknowledge that
standards of decency evolve in nations other than the United States.
Chief Justice Gubbay continued his analysis by quoting from several U.S. Supreme Court and Indian judicial decisions that described "the
mental agony of being on death row. '92 It also considered the manner in
which the courts of India, the United States Supreme Court, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom, the European
Court of Human Rights, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee
have resolved the question of whether the conditions on death row are cruel
and inhuman. 93 The decision in People v. Anderson94 was considered "a far
more progressive and compassionate approach" by the Court. 95 Anderson
was a California case that held that the conditions on death row violated
96
California's Constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
The Zimbabwae Supreme Court also approved of the judgement97by the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom.
While the decision of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court may be seen as
the realization of the customary norm against the death penalty and an action toward abolition out of a sense of legal obligation, the remainder of the
government has failed to conform to the abolitionist norm. Following the
Court's decision, the Constitution was amended to foreclose cruel and inhu98
man treatment as grounds for reviewing death sentences.
A second decision that surveyed international treatment of the death
penalty was State v. T Makwanyane and M Mchunu99 , in which the South
African Constitutional Court found the death penalty unconstitutional. The
opinion written by President Chaskalson surveyed the treatment of the
death penalty internationally and concluded that the death penalty violated
the Constitutional prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, as informed by the rights to life and dignity contained in sec-

92

See supra note 89, at 323.

93

See id. at 324.

493 P.2d 880 (1972).
95 See supra note 89, at 325.
94

97

Id.
Supra note 82.

98

See supra note 42, at 6.

96

99 Judgement No. CCT/3/94 (1995).
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tions 9 and 10 of the Constitution. 100 The opinions of the Constitutional
Court were also very morally charged, believing that it was the State's duty
to serve as the moral exemplar. The alternative was to allow the killer to
"unwittingly achiev[e] a final and perverse moral victory by making the
state a killer too, thus reducing social abhorrence at the conscious extinction
of human beings." 10 1 The Court's recognition of the intermingling of law
and morality can be attributed to the human rights movement, the liberal
tradition of fundamental individual rights, and the traditional South African
concept of Ubuntu.10 2 Ubuntu is "a basic respect for life and dignity, and is
10 3
foundational to the structure of rights in the Constitution."'
The Constitutional Court thoroughly examined the treatment of the
death penalty by the United States, India, the ICCPR, and the European
Convention on Human Rights for assistance in interpreting their own Constitution. An important distinction exists between the analytical inquiry
used by the South African Constitutional Court and that used by the United
States Supreme Court for determining what South Africa calls a "limitation
of rights" and the U.S. calls "due process" analysis. In South Africa, the
appropriate inquiry is "whether the infliction of death as a punishment for
murder has been shown to be both reasonable and necessary."' 1 4 "It is not
whether the infliction of death as a punishment for murder 'is not without
justification, as it is in the United States.' " 0 5 As the phrasing of the two
inquiries might suggest, the Constitutional Court was led to a different conclusion regarding the Constitutionality of the death penalty.
The Makwanyane opinion is an excellent example of a state abolishing the death penalty with opino juris. After consideration of national
and international law, the Constitutional Court felt legally and morally obligated to abolish the death penalty. The Makwanyane case also provides a
basis for understanding where the United States has gone astray in conforming with the customary norm of abolishment.

See id. (opinion by Chaskalson, P); Bernard E. Harcourt, Mature Adjudication:
Interpretive Choice in Recent Death Penalty Cases, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 255
(1996).
101 Id. (opinion by Sachs, J.)
100

102

See Harcourt, supra note 100, at 258.

103 Id., quoting State v. T Makwanyane and M Mchunu, supra note 99, at 484A
(Madala, J., concurring)
102 (Chaskalson, P.).
104 See supra, note 100,
105 Id. (referring to the American due process inquiry).
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PRACTICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IS

INCONSISTENT WITH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United States has been faced with the same problems as other
nations that have since abolished the death penalty. However, the United
States has failed to act in conformity with these other countries. Various
actors within the United States government have felt compelled to abolish
the death penalty, but they have been silenced by those who choose to ignore their international obligations and allow the United States to continue
to use the death penalty in a manner that is inconsistent with customary law
and international agreements.
1. Actions by the United States Congress
Following the Makwanyane opinion, several members of Congress
felt legally obligated to abolish the death penalty. Senator Mosley Brown,
addressed the President and members of the Senate, sixteen days after the
Makwanyane decision was handed down.

Mr. President, the new Government of South Africa has just abolished the death penalty.... South Africa has looked to the United States as
a model as it creates its institutions of government ....

As a lawyer and a

Senator, I take pride in the fact that South Africa is looking to our legal
system and our body of laws as a model. But in the case of the death
penalty, after thoroughly examining its practice in the United States, the 11
Justices of the Constitutional Court of South Africa unanimously concluded
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment subject to elements

of arbitrariness and the possibility of error.... In effect the South African
Court reached the same conclusion as former United States Supreme Court
Justice, Harry Blackmun, who concluded that the death penalty experiment
has failed ....

The Government of South Africa has come to the decision

that the recognition of the right to life and dignity is incompatible with the
death penalty. I applaud them for it.106
Eight days later, members of the House of Representatives proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would abolish the death
penalty. The proposed Amendment stated "The Death Penalty shall not be
imposed or executed by the United States, or by any State, Territory or
other jurisdiction within the United States." 107 Upon its introduction, Mr.

Gonzalez made reference to the Makwanyane decision in South Africa and
stated that "we should live up to no lower of a standard in our continuing
106
107

50 Cong. Rec. Art 2 (June 22, 1995)(Sen. Mosely-Braun).
H.R.J. Res. 99, 104th Congress (June 30, 1995)(proposed).
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effort to uphold democracy and justice in our own land."' 08 Mr. Gonzalez
also made reference to the prohibition on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment" in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and contended that the methods of execution in the United States violated
this provision. 109 Unfortunately, the proposed amendment spent the remainder of the term of the 104th Congress in the House Judiciary subcommittee
on the Constitution. The Amendment was not reintroduced during the
105th or 106th Congress.
The immediate response of members of the Senate and House to the
Makwanyane decision demonstrates that they felt compelled to act in the
manner that South Africa did. The response was also important because it
may have set a precedent for looking to international law and foreign actors
to evaluate weather U.S. law is consistent with the human rights standards
of the majority of the world.
However, the regard for international norms shown by the 104th
Congress in 1995 was completely disregarded by Congress only one year
later when it passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"). 110 The AEDPA, through its habeas corpus
reform, significantly limited the ability of prisoners to appeal to federal
courts for habeas corpus relief."' The provisions addressing habeas corpus
petitions by prisoners facing death sentences are even more stringent than
those applicable to prisoners generally.
The AEDPA reformed habeas corpus by placing limitations on the
types of cases on which a federal court can hear a habeas corpus petition,
the amount of time during which a prisoner can file an application for
habeas corpus relief, and the scope of federal habeas review. Under section
2244 of the AEDPA, a prisoner has a one year period during which to petition for habeas corpus relief. This period begins to run from the latest of
the date (1) a final judgement based on direct review or the expiration of
time to file for such review, (2) the date on which filing an application
created by state action in violation of the Constitution is removed, (3) the
date on which the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim
12
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
50 Cong. Rec. art. 2 (House- June 30, 1995)(Rep. Gonzalez).
'09 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (entered into force Dec. 10, 1948).
110 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in various sections of 28
U.S.C.).
108

llI See id. § 101-108, 110 Stat. at 1217-1226.
112 See supra note 110 § 2244(d)(l)(A)-(D).
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An application for habeas relief is not granted, that is not heard,
unless the petitioner shows that (1) he has exhausted all of the remedies in
the courts of the state in which he is in custody or there is an absence of
state corrective process or (2) circumstances exist that make the state process ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights. Moreover, an application
for a writ of habeas corpus is not be granted following a state court's adjudication on the merits unless the state's decision was "contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court" or "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during the state proceeding."11 3 Claims raised in a prior petition for habeas corpus are
114
dismissed.
As if these legal hurdles were nit high enough, the AEDPA imposed even more stringent standards on prisoners facing a death sentence.
These limitations apply where a prisoner is facing a death sentence in a
state that provides counsel to petitioners who cannot afford representation,
or where petitioners waive their right to such appointed counsel. H5 Section
2263 limits the time during which a prisoner facing a capital sentence can
6
petition for habeas corpus relief to one hundred and eighty days."
An automatic stay of execution runs from the time the petition is
filed until the one hundred eighty days expire, the petitioner waives his
right to petition, or a district court determines that petitioner failed to make
a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. 1 7 A federal district
court that considers a petition for habeas corpus relief must make its decision within 180 days after the petition is filed.
The AEDPA also states that "the ineffectiveness or incompetence
of counsel during state or federal post conviction proceedings ...shall not
be a ground for relief." This provision alone can be devastating to indigent
or mentally impaired capital prisoners whose under funded and/or inexperienced counsel may not represent them effectively; it is the condemned prisoner who pays the price of his life for his attorney's ineptitude.
Moreover, this provision eliminates the denial of right to counsel,
as guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
See id. § 104 (28 USCA 2254(d)(1)-(2).
H4 See id § 2244(b)(3)(E).
"5 See id. § 2261.
116 See id. at 2261.
117 See David Blumberg, Note, Habeas Leaps From the Pan into the Fire: Jacobs
v. Scott and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L.
"3

REv. 557, 584 (1997) (citing AEDPA 28 USCA 2262(b)(3)).
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a basis of a petition for habeas corpus.' 18 The case of Moore v. Johnson
demonstrates the injustice that results from this "reform" of habeas corpus
relief under the AEDPA. In 1996, the fifth circuit applied the AEDPA and
rejected Mr. Moore's petition for habeas corpus relief, which was based on
the inadequacy of his legal representation at trial. 119 Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Lindh v. Murphy 120 , ruled that the AEDPA, passed in 1996,
did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the fifth circuit reconsidered Mr.
Moore's appeal and applied pre-AEDPA law. The court was appalled by
the inadequacy of Mr. Moore's representation by counsel and granted him a
new sentencing hearing, which is due to take place in 2001.121 Mr. Moore's
case illustrates how the AEDPA will allow prisoners who have had their
sixth Amendment right violated to be executed irrespective of this violation.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
executions, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiave, expressed his concern that, by severely
limiting the ability of the federal courts to remedy errors and abuses in state
proceedings, the AEDPA has "further jeopardized the implementation of
the right to a fair trial, as provided by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other international agreements."' 122 Mr. Ndiave's
concerns are merited given that the AEDPA has prioritized finality over
fairness in its misguided attempt to expedite the time between sentencing
and execution. 123 Under the AEDPA, some prisoners may be executed
without any state or federal review of their case, as was the fate of Andrew
Cantu. 124
In denying to hear Mr. Cantu's petition for habeas corpus relief, the
fifth circuit summarized the purpose of the ADEPA's limitation on time
during which to file for habeas corpus relief as one "to bring regularity and
118

U.S. CONST. 6TH Amend.

119 Moore v. Johnson, 101 F. 3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. grant, 521 U.S. 1115
117 S. Ct. 2504 (1997) (the court vacated and remanded the judgement in light of
Lindh v. Murphy); see supra note 33, at 30.
120 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
121 Moore v. Johnson, 185 F. 3d 244 (5th Cir. 1999).
122 See supra note 80.
123 See supra note 117, at 584; citing Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Human Rights: A Tribute Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL

L. REv. 1477, 1489 (1996) ("The principle reason why habeas reform

legislation has been enacted is that Congress and much of the public assume that
habeas claims are almost always frivolous, and they want death row inmates to get
executed quickly").
124 See supra note 33, at 32.
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finality to federal habeas proceedings."' 25 Mr. Cantu filed his petition for
habeas corpus relief after the time period prescribed by the AEDPA had
expired. As a result of this choice of finality over fairness, Mr. Cantu was
executed on February 16, 1999, without any state or federal court ever hear26
ing his appeal.'
2.

Action by the United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to
consider the legality of the death penalty. In so doing, the Court has restricted itself to a Constitutional analysis that has led to "an artificial formalism that can be as tyrannical as rampant subjectivity.' 1 27 The Supreme
Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia
128
because it was administered in an arbitrary and discriminatory matter.
Only four years later, the Court rescinded its decision in Furman with
Gregg v. Georgia.1 29 In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty would be Constitutional where the state statute made some efforts to
protect against the arbitrariness disproved of in Furman. This was a surprisingly lenient standard given that several of the opinions in Furman focused on the arbitrary application of the death penalty, not the statute itself.
The first Supreme Court case to challenge the Constitutionality of
the death penalty after Gregg was Callins v. Collins.130 The Callins decision was made only one year before the Makwanyane decision and thus
provides an excellent example of how the United States Supreme Court has
failed to resolve its death penalty jurisprudence in the same morally astute
manner employed by the South African Constitutional Court.
Harcourt characterized the dilemma in Callins as one of interpretive
choice and compared it to the interpretive choice made in Makwanyane 31 .
The Callins opinion was an interesting case of interpretive choice because
both Scalia, as the majority, and Blackmun, in dissent, agreed that the Constitutional commands facing courts in death penalty cases are ultimately
irreconcilable 32. On the one hand, defendants have the right to individualCantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct.
847 (1999); see supra note 33, at 32.
125

126

See id at 32.

127

Harcourt, supra note 100, at 263.
408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).

128

130

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).

131

See Harcourt, supra note 100, at 260.

132

See id.
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ity in punishment. On the other, defendants have the right to consistency,
so that decisions are not arbitrary. Blackmun believes that the two are
equally important to fundamental freedom, but ultimately irreconcilably in
conflict.' 3 3 Thus, Blackmun vowed, "From this day forward, I will no
longer tinker with the machinery of death."' 134 Justice Blackmun's conclusion was very significant given his prior opinions on the death penalty; he
had dissented in Furman and was in the majority of Gregg.
Blackmun did not urge the Court to consider the changing international norms of an evolving society, as did the court in Makwanyane, but he
reached the same conclusion. It was the survey of the international norms
in an evolving society that led the South African Constitutional Court to
develop the opino juris to abolish the death penalty. However, it could be
that Justice Blackmun had such thoughts driving his decision, even though
he did not articulate them in his opinion. Only one month later, he spoke at
an American Society of International Law dinner about the need for the
United States to recognize international law in its decision making. 35 In
that speech, he acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent recognized the
binding nature of international law and stated that the eighth amendment
"evolving standards of decency" analysis required a comparison to international norms.

136

In Callins, Scalia and the majority chose a decision that was devoid, both in result and analysis, of an acknowledgment of international
law. For Scalia, the answer to the conflict between individuality and consistency was to overrule decisions articulating the right to individual sentencing in death penalty cases.1 37 Scalia's decision making is in sharp
contrast to that of the court in Makwanyane, which Harcourt appropriately
138
labeled "the vision of mature adjudication."'
3.

Actions by the States

State action, as a whole, has failed to comply with international law
on the abolition of the death penalty. However, recent years have not been
entirely without promise for state action toward abolition of the death penalty. In 1999, Montana became the fifteenth of the thirty-eight states using

135

See id.
Id., quoting Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra, note 17.

136

Id.

133

134

137 Harcourt, supra note 100, at 261 (citing Callins, 114 S. Ct. 1128 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
138 Id. at 263.
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the death penalty to ban the use of the death penalty against juvenile offenders and South Dakota became the thirteenth state to ban its use against the
139
mentally retarded.
The most important of all recent developments within the states
came from Illinois on January 31, 2000. On that day, Governor Ryan made
Illinois an example to all states when he declared a moratorium on the use
of the death penalty in the state of Illinois. The Governor's decision came
in response to the numbers of innocent men placed on Illinois' death row.
Despite these gains toward abolition, thirty-eight of the fifty U.S.
states still allow for the use of death penalty. 14o The most lethal among all
states using the death penalty is Texas, which executed 173 of the 540 persons put to death in the United States since 1977.141 The lethal injection
chamber in Huntsville, Texas has put more inmates to death than any other
state in the nation, killing over 200 people. 142 More chilling than these statistics is the fact that the jurisdiction, which executes one third of the nations capital prisoners, maintains no meaningful form of clemency review.
The eighteen members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles (hereinafter "BPP") supervises review of applications for sentencing reductions for
all prisoners in Texas. The Executive Clemency Unit of the BPP processes
applications for clemency and sends copies of all applications to the eighteen members of the BPP. 143 Each member individually reviews the application and votes on a standardized form whether a commutation of sentence
or reprieve should be granted. The BPP never convenes as a group to discuss the applications; nor do the members hold a public hearing, give reasons for their votes, or even use any standard or articuable criteria in
making its clemency decisions.
In seventeen years, the BPP has recommended the commutation of
a death sentence only once. 44 Excluding Texas, the national average for
executive commutations to executions is 10.6 percent. In Texas that ratio is
.6 percent. 145 This means that prisoners in Texas have virtually no hope of
5.

139

See id. at

140

See supra note 33, at 3.
Killing Without Mercy: Clemency Procedures in Texas,

141

AMNESTY INTERNA-

at 3 (June 1999). In 1977, the United States lifted the moratorium
on capital sentences. Texas has been executing capital prisoners since 1982. See
supra note 33 at 7.
142 See supra note 33, at 11. Over 100 of these executions have occurred since
TIONAL REPORT,

1995. See id.
143 See supra note 137, at 3.
144 See id at 2.
145 Id. at 3.
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commutation of their sentence, despite the merits of their claim, because the
Governor cannot commute a death sentence without a positive recommendation from the BPP. 146
The pleas for clemency that the BPP has denied have included
claims of innocence, juveniles and mentally retarded persons for which the
jury heard no mitigating factors, and rehabilitated prisoners who found religion and began to minister to others. 147 The BPP has also denied clemency in the face of an appeal by Secretary of State, Madeline Albright. Ms.
Albright sent a fifteen page letter to Governor Bush and the BPP requesting
commutation of the deaths sentence of Stanley Faulder, a Canadian citizen,
on the basis that arresting authorities failed to inform Faulder of his right to
consular assistance. This right is guaranteed by Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular relations, to which the United States is a party.
Thus, Stanley Faulder's scheduled execution violated this treaty. Irrespective of this fact, the BPP refused Ms. Albright's offer to send personnel
from the State Department to brief the BPP on consular rights under the
48
Treaty and denied Mr. Faulder's petition for clemency.
The Texas Governor has also worked to ensure that the machinery
of death in Texas operates as a well-oiled machine. In 1999, the Governor
vetoed a Bill to improve the selection of lawyers for low income defendants, which was passed by both houses of the Texas Legislature. 49 The
Governor also reportedly opposed a Bill introduced in the legislature to
prohibit the use of the death penalty against mentally retarded defendants. 150
Worse than the behavior of Texas, which is in clear violation of
international law, is the fact that the governors of other U.S. states have
looked at Texas as a model that they seek to emulate. Officials from New
Mexico and Tennessee have visited the Texas lethal injection chamber to
prepare for their first executions since 1960.151 The Florida Governor exSee id. at 3.
See id. at 4-6.
148 See id. at 7. Subsequently, Mr. Faulder appealed to the 5th Circuit and U.S.
146
147

Supreme Court on the basis that the BPP's review of Faulder's petition failed to
meet minimum safeguards established by the Supreme Court in Woodward v. Ohio
Adult Parole Authority, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S. Ct. 12444 (1998). See Faulder v.
Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F. 3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1017, 119 S. Ct. 2362 (June 16, 1999). The Supreme Court ultimately denied
his appeal, but granted Faulder an indefinite stay of execution, on other grounds,
minutes before he was scheduled to enter the gas chamber. See id. at 7-8.
149 See supra note 33, at 7.
150 See Id.
151 See id. at 8.
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pressed his desire to emulate the rate of Texas executions and, in an effort
to do so, signed the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 into law on January
7, 2000.152 The law was modeled on Texas law and sets time limits on
53
appeals.
4. Evaluating US Justifications for its Failure to Comply with
Customary International Law Abolishing the Death Penalty
In light of its failure to abolish the death penalty in conformance
with international customary norms, the United States has attempted to explain its retentionist position as consistent with international human rights
law. 154 "The United States Law places special emphasis on due process
protection for those accused of capital punishment."' 155 The invalidity of
this statement has already been addressed to some extent by previous discussion. Moreover, the fact that due process guarantees do not exist to the
same extent in fact, as they do in promise, was exposed in the report of the
Special Rapporteur on summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions after his mission to the United States 156.
The Special Rapporteur noted that the same unfairness and arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty that caused the Supreme
Court to rule that the use of the death penalty was unconstitutional in 1972
still existed in its present use. 157 His criticisms may be grouped as concerns
with both the scope and the administration of the death penalty.
The scope has been expanded by reinstating the death penalty and
by increasing the number of aggravating circumstances that can qualify a
murder as a capital case. 58 The Rapporteur found this expansion in scope
troublesome because the ICCPR aims at restricting the use of the death
penalty to only the most extreme cases, with the hope of eventually decreasing its use in those countries still using the practice.
The execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons was also
very troublesome to the Special Rapporteur. The Rapporteur stated that
customary international law clearly prohibits the execution of individuals
See id.
153 See id. Currently, the law has been suspended while the Florida Supreme Court
considers whether the Act is Constitutional.
154 See supra note 80.
155 Id. at para. 3.
156 See supra note 80.
157 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct 2726 (1972).
158 See supra, note 80,
47.
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who were under the age of 18 when they committed the offense' 1 9. However, 25 of the 38 states that permit capital punishment establish an age less
than 18 as the minimum age requirement. 16°
At least 29 people with severe mental disabilities have been executed in the United States since 1976.161 At the very least, the Special Rapporteur believed that mental incapacity should serve as a mitigating factor
in determining sentencing.
The administration of the death penalty in the United States is also
a problem. The small percentage of those who receive the death penalty are
not those who commit the most heinous crimes. "Many factors, other than
the crime itself, appear to influence the imposition of the death sentence.
Class, race and economic status, both of the victim and the defendant, are
said to be key elements." 162 It is alleged that those who are able to afford
good legal representation have lees chance of being sentenced to death. 163
The Report traced the sources of these biases to the judiciary, prosecutorial
discretion, the jury selection process, and impediments to the right to seek
pardon or appeal a ruling.
The Report questioned whether the election of judges compromised
their independence. In 32 of the 38 death penalty states, judges are subject
to election. 164 "It is difficult to determine the influence that the electorate
and a financial contribution to an election campaign have on a judge. ' 165
The Special Rapporteur found that it is very difficult for a judge who has
reservations against the death penalty to be elected. Several examples existed of judges who were not re-elected because they overturned or refused
to implement the death penalty in a particular case. 166
Prosecutorial discretion in choosing to seek the death penalty in a
case was also found to be a source of bias. Even when a particular case
meets the aggravating factors that the relevant statute sets forth, the prosecutor has the discretion not to seek the death penalty. 167 "[S]ome prosecutors seek the death penalty all the time while others, in similar cases, will
49.
See id. at 51. Four states set 17 as the minimum age, while 21 states set 16 as
the minimum age. Only 14 states establish 18 as the minimum age.
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not."' 168 This difference in attitude toward choosing the death penalty in
similar cases leads to the arbitrary use of the death penalty as a punishment.
Some factor other than the crime itself, namely prosecutorial attitudes, determines whether a convicted person will live or die. The decision is really
one that is not left solely to the juries.
The jury selection process was also determined to contribute to the
arbitrary administration of the death penalty. In 28 of the 38 death penalty
states, the jury decides whether a defendant will receive the death penalty. 169 One problem regarding juries is that their composition does not
seem to reflect a jury of the defendant's peers. For example, a black defendant is often tried by a jury comprised solely of white people. Additionally,
all jurors who oppose the death penalty are excluded from sitting as jurors,
thus preventing the jury from being an accurate reflection of the community
and its values.
Finally, the Special Rapporteur found that the guidance that the jury
receives tended to bias it toward using the penalty. For example, in Texas a
jury cannot be instructed on the meaning of "life imprisonment."' 170 Jurors
may believe that a defendant will be released from prison after a short
amount of time.
The US has failed to respond to the Special Rapporteur's findings
with any action to address the problems that were disclosed; it remains unable to defend its retentionist position. United States' politicians may defend
the use of the death penalty by citing the frequently canted and unfounded
rationales of deterrence, retribution, or public support. The death penalty
has failed to deter crime any more effectively than other methods of punishment.' 7 ' For example, the murder rate in Massachusetts, which does not use
the death penalty, is half the national average. 172 Similarly, the murder rate
in Canada dropped 34 percent from the abolition of the death penalty in
1976 and the end of 1995.173
The rationales of retribution and public support are equally without
merit. The Constitutional Court of South Africa understood that killing was
not more just when committed under the veil of a state legal system; the
United States should follow South Africa's example and realize that law
and morality are inextricably intertwined. The state should serve as the
moral exemplar in a truly just society. Moreover, there is no evidence to
168
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show that the state is easing the pain of the victim's family by executing his
murderer. 174 Relatives of murder victims do not report that the execution of
175
their loved one's killer helps them deal with their loss.
Finally, the fact that the public may support the death penalty is not
a basis to continue violating human rights. It is not even clear that the
public favors the death penalty, since support drops when interviewees are
given alternative choices such as life imprisonment. 76 Furthermore, society
has supported many human rights violations in the United States, such as
slavery, lynching, and racial segregation. 77 Once United States Government officials accept their responsibility to uphold universal legal and
moral standards, the death penalty will join the aforementioned human
rights violations as an ugly part of American history.
While the US believes that it has procedural safeguards in place
that allow the death penalty to be conducted in a manner that is consistent
with human rights, it has failed to realize that it and all other retentionist
nations have violated various human rights provisions in their use of the
death penalty. This leads to one of two conclusions. First, the practice of
the death penalty cannot be reconciled with the preservation of human
rights or, second, the majority of conformist nations will never interpret
non-conformist behavior as consistent with human rights. While the first
conclusion considers the irreconcilable nature of the death penalty and
human rights a fact, the second views irreconcilable nature as a product of
those charged with monitoring human rights viewing the death penalty as
inconsistent with human rights.
In either case, the point is clear that the abolition of the death penalty has risen to the level of customary international law. As conformist
nations have criticized non-conformist behavior, these retentionist nations,
like the United States, should feel legally obligated to conform to the customary norm and abolish the death penalty.
V.

CONCLUSION

The abolition of the death penalty has risen to the level of customary international law. The majority of nations have acted by abolishing the
death penalty in their nations and acting through international organizations
to monitor the pace of universal abolition. The abolition of the death penalty has taken place with the requisite opino juris. In addition to the act of
174
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widespread abolition, other evidence of opino juris can be found in international instruments aimed at universal abolishment, the actions of states
through international organizations, states' efforts to target non-conformist
nations, states' refusal to extradite people for capital offenses, and the opinions of national tribunals. All sources demonstrate that abolition of the
death penalty is widespread and with opino juris.
In spite of the United States' obligation to comply with customary
international law and international agreements, the United States has failed
to recognize its obligation to abolish the death penalty. The death penalty is
still widely used in the United States in a manner that violates human rights.
The United States must realize that the use of the death penalty is incompatible with the human rights it is legally and morally obligated to protect.
Given that the United States is in violation of international law and
failing to adequately protect the human rights of its citizens, specific action
should be taken to abolish the use of the death penalty. First, the United
States should declare a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, in compliance with requests by the international community. Secondly, Congress
should reintroduce the Constitutional Amendment to abolish the death penalty that was proposed in 1995, during the 104th Congress. Finally, the
Supreme Court should adopt a method of interpretive adjudication that is
cognizant of international law and practice. All of these methods would
bring the United States in conformity with international law regarding the
death penalty.

